Prophet Inequality with Correlated Arrival Probabilities, with
  Application to Two Sided Matchings by Truong, Van-Anh & Wang, Xinshang
Prophet Inequality with Correlated Arrival
Probabilities, with Application to Two Sided
Matchings
Van-Anh Truong, Xinshang Wang
Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA,
vatruong@ieor.columbia.edu, xw2230@columbia.edu
The classical Prophet Inequality arises from a fundamental problem in optimal-stopping theory. In this
problem, a gambler sees a finite sequence of independent, non-negative random variables. If he stops the
sequence at any time, he collects a reward equal to the most recent observation. The Prophet Inequality
states that, knowing the distribution of each random variable, the gambler can achieve at least half as
much reward in expectation, as a prophet who knows the entire sample path of random variables (Krengel
and Sucheston 1978). In this paper, we prove a corresponding bound for correlated non-negative random
variables. We analyze two methods for proving the bound, a constructive approach, which produces a worst-
case instance, and a reductive approach, which characterizes a certain submartingale arising from the reward
process of our online algorithm.
We apply this new prophet inequality to the design of algorithms for a class of two-sided bipartite matching
problems that underlie online task assignment problems. In these problems, demand units of various types
arrive randomly and sequentially over time according to some stochastic process. Tasks, or supply units,
arrive according to another stochastic process. Each demand unit must be irrevocably matched to a supply
unit or rejected. The match earns a reward that depends on the pair. The objective is to maximize the
total expected reward over the planning horizon. The problem arises in mobile crowd-sensing and crowd
sourcing contexts, where workers and tasks must be matched by a platform according to various criteria. We
derive the first online algorithms with worst-case performance guarantees for our class of two-sided bipartite
matching problems.
1. Introduction
The classical Prophet Inequality arises from a fundamental problem in optimal-stopping theory. In
this problem, a gambler sees a finite sequence of independent, non-negative random variables. If
he stops the sequence at any time, he collects a reward equal to the most recent observation. The
Prophet Inequality states that, knowing the distribution of each random variable, the gambler can
achieve at least half as much reward in expectation, as a prophet who knows the entire sample
path of random variables (Krengel and Sucheston 1978). The classical prophet inequality with
independent random variables was proved by Krengel and Sucheston (1977). Its importance arises
from its role as a primitive in a wide range of decision problems. Since the appearance of the
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first result, various versions of the prophet inequality has been proved. Hill and Kertz (1983)
study the inequality for independent, uniformly bounded random variables. Rinott et al. (1987)
prove a version for bounded negatively-dependent random variables. Samuel-Cahn (1991) obtain
general results for negatively dependent random variables, and provide some examples for the
case of positively dependent variables. In this paper, we study a version of prophet inequality
where the sequence of random variables are modeled as a customer arrival process and can be
arbitrarily correlated. The specification of our prophet inequality will be made clear in the problem
formulation.
We apply this new prophet inequality to the design of algorithms for a class of two-sided bipartite
matching problems underlying online task assignment problems (OTA). In these problems, demand
units of various types arrive randomly and sequentially over time according to some stochastic
process. Tasks, or supply units, arrive according to another stochastic process. Each demand unit
must be irrevocably matched to a supply unit or rejected. The match earns a reward that depends
on the pair. The objective is to maximize the total expected reward over the planning horizon.
The problem arises in mobile crowd-sensing and crowd-sourcing contexts, where workers and tasks
that arrive randomly overtime and must be matched by a platform according to various criteria.
For example, the marketplaces Upwork, Fiverr, and Freelancer match providers with customers of
professional services. Walmart evaluated a proposal to source its own customers to deliver orders
(Barr and Wohl 2013). The mobile platforms Sensorly, Vericell, VTrack, and PIER outsource the
task of collecting analyzing data, called sensing, to millions of mobile users. Enabled by information
technology, these crowd-sourcing and crowd-sensing businesses are revolutionalizing the traditional
marketplace. For example, Freelancers constitute 35% of the U.S. workforce and have generated a
trillion dollars in income as of 2015 (Pofeldt 2016). A survey found that 73% of freelancers have
found work more easily because of technology (Pofeldt 2016).
The two-sided matching problem that underlies many examples of OTA is very difficult to solve
optimally, due to three main reasons. First, given the many characteristics of both demand and
supply types and their importance in determining the quality of a match, the decision problem
must keep track of a vast amount of information, including the current state of supply and future
demand and supply arrivals. Second, both demand and supply processes may change over time,
so that the decision-making environment might be constantly changing. Third, demand units tend
to be time-sensitive and unmatched supply units might also leave the system after a time, so that
they have a finite period of availability.
Our contributions in this paper are as follow:
• We prove the first prophet inequality for a class of arbitrarily correlated non-negative random
variables. We analyze two methods for proving the bound, a constructive approach, which produces
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a worst-case instance, and a reductive approach, which characterizes a certain submartingale arising
from the reward process of our online algorithm.
• We formulate a new model of bipartite matching with non-homogenous Poisson arrivals for
both demand and supply units. Supply units can wait a deterministic amount of time, whereas
demand units must be matched irrevocably upon arrival. Decisions are not batched and must be
made for one demand unit at at time. Our model underlies an important class of online task
assignment problems for crowd-sourcing and crowd-sensing applications.
• We derive the first online algorithms with worst-case performance guarantees for our class of
two-sided bipartite matching problems. We prove that our algorithms have expected reward no
less than 1
4
times that of an optimal offline policy, which knows all demand and supply arrivals
upfront and makes optimal decisions given this information.
• We provide numerical experiments showing that despite the conservative provable ratio of
1/4, our online algorithm captures about half of the offline expected reward. We propose improved
algorithms that in the experiments capture 65% to 70% of the offline expected reward. Moreover,
the improved algorithms outperform the greedy and the bid-price heuristics in all scenarios. These
results demonstrate the advantage of using our online algorithms as they have not only optimized
performance in the worst-case scenario, but also satisfactory performance in average-case scenarios.
2. Literature Review
We review five streams of literature that are most closely related to our problem class.
2.1. Static matching
A variety of matching problems have been studied in static settings, for example, college-admissions
problems, marriage problems, and static assignment problems. In these problems, the demand and
supply units are known. The reward of matching each demand with each supply unit is also known.
The objective is to find a maximum-reward matching. See Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez (2013) for
a recent review. Our setting differs in that demand units arrive randomly over time and decisions
must be made before all the units have been fully observed.
2.2. Dynamic assignment
Dynamic-assignment problems are a class of problems in which a set of resources must be dynam-
ically assigned to a stream of tasks that randomly arrive over time. These problems have a long
history, beginning with Derman, Lieberman and Ross (1972). See Su and Zenios (2005) for a recent
review of this literature.
Spivey and Powell (2004) study a version of the dynamic assignment problem in which the
resources may arrive randomly over time. They develop approximate-dynamic-programming heuris-
tics for the problem. They do not derive performance bounds for their heuristics.
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Anderson et al. (2013) study a specialized model in which supply and demand units are identical,
and arrivals are stationary over time. They characterize the performance of the greedy policy
under various structures for the demand-supply graph, where the objective is to minimize the total
waiting time for all supply units.
Akbarpour et al. (2014) analyze a dynamic matching problem for which they derive several broad
insights. They analyze two algorithms for which they derive bounds on the relative performance
under various market conditions. Their work differs from ours in four ways. First, they assume
that arrivals are stationary where as we allow non-stationary arrivals. Second, they assume that
demand units are identical except for the time of arrivals and supply units are also identical except
for the time of arrival, whereas we allow heterogeneity among the units. Finally, they study an
unweighted matching problem in which each match earns a unit reward, whereas we study a more
general weighted matching problem. Finally, their results hold in asymptotic regimes, where the
market is large and the horizon is long, whereas our results hold in any condition.
More recently Hu and Zhou (2015) study a dynamic assignment problem for two-sided markets
similar to ours. They also allow for random, non-stationary arrivals of demand and supply units.
They derive structural results for the optimal policy and asymptotic bounds. We depart from both
of the above papers in focusing on providing algorithms with theoretical performance guarantees
on all problem instances.
Baccara et al. (2015) study a dynamic matching problem in which demand units can wait, and
there is a tradeoff between waiting for a higher-quality match, and incurring higher waiting costs.
Their setting is limited to just two types of units (demand or supply), whereas we allow arbitrarily
many types. They also assume stationary arrivals whereas we allow non-stationary arrivals.
2.3. Online Matching
In online matching, our work fundamentally extends the class of problems that have been widely
studied. In existing online matching problems, the set of available supply units is known and
corresponds to one set of nodes. Demand units arrive one by one, and correspond to a second set
of nodes. As each demand node arises, its adjacency to the resource nodes is revealed. Each edge
has an associated weight. The system must match each demand node irrevocably to an adjacent
supply node. The goal is to maximize the total weighted or unweighted size of the matching.
When demands are chosen by an adversary, the online unweighted bipartite matching problem
is originally shown by Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani (1990) to have a worst-case relative reward of
0.5 for deterministic algorithms and 1−1/e for randomized algorithms. The weighted this problem
cannot be bounded by any constant (Mehta 2012). Many subsequent works have tried to design
algorithms with bounded relative reward for this problem under more regulated demand processes.
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Three types of demand processes have been studied. The first type of demand processes studied
is one in which each demand node is independently and identically chosen with replacement from
a known set of nodes. Under this assumption, (Jaillet and Lu 2013, Manshadi et al. 2012, Bahmani
and Kapralov 2010, Feldman et al. 2009) propose online algorithms with worst-case relative reward
higher than 1− 1/e for the unweighted problem. Haeupler, Mirrokni, Vahab and Zadimoghaddam
(2011) study online algorithms with worst-case relative reward higher than 1−1/e for the weighted
bipartite matching problem.
The second type of demand processes studied is one in which the demand nodes are drawn
randomly without replacement from an unknown set of nodes. This assumption has been used
in the secretary problem (Kleinberg 2005, Babaioff, Immorlica, Kempe, and Kleinberg 2008), ad-
words problem (Goel and Mehta 2008) and bipartite matching problem (Mahdian and Yan 2011,
Karande, Mehta, and Tripathi 2011).
A variation to the second type of demand processes studied is one in which each demand node
requests a very small amount of resource. This assumption, called the small bid assumption,
together with the assumption of randomly drawn demands, lead to polynomial-time approxima-
tion schemes (PTAS) for problems such as ad-words (Devanur 2009), stochastic packing (Feldman,
Henzinger, Korula, Mirrokni, and Stein 2010), online linear programming (Agrawal, Wang and Ye
2009), and packing problems (Molinaro and Ravi 2013). Typically, the PTAS proposed in these
works use dual prices to make allocation decisions. Devanur, Jain, Sivan, and Wilkens (2011) study
a resource-allocation problem in which the distribution of nodes is allowed to change over time,
but still needs to follow a requirement that the distribution at any moment induce a small enough
offline objective value. They then study the asymptotic performance of their algorithm. In our
model, the amount capacity requested by each customer is not necessary small relative to the total
amount of capacity available.
The third type of demand processes studied are independent, non-homogenous Poisson processes.
Alaei, Hajiaghayi and Liaghat (2012), Wang, Truong and Bank (2015) and Stein, Truong and Wang
(2017) propose online algorithms for online allocation problems. We depart from these papers
in two major ways. The algorithms in these papers consist of two main steps. In the first step,
they solve a deterministic assignment LP to find the probabilities of routing each demand to each
supply unit. Given this routing, in the second step, they make an online decision to determine
whether to match a routed demand unit to a supply unit at any given time. In contrast, in the
first step, we find conditional probabilities of routing demand to supply units, given the set of
supply units that have arrived at any given time. We approximate these conditional probabilities
because they are intractable to compute directly. In the second step, after routing demands to
supply units according to these conditional probabilities, we design an admission algorithm based
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on the solution of our prophet inequality that, unlike existing admission techniques, deals with
correlated demand arrivals.
2.4. Online Task Assignment
This is a subclass of online matching problems that has seen an explosion of interest in recent years.
Almost all of these works model either the tasks or the workers as being fixed. Ho and Vaughan
(2012), Assadi et al. (2015), Hassan and Curry (2014), Manshadi et al. (2012) study variations of
OTA problems. Singer and Mittal (2013) consider both pricing and allocation decisions for OTA.
Singla and Krause (2013) study both learning and allocation decisions for OTA. Zhao et al. (2014),
Subramanian et al. (2015) study auction mechanism for OTA.
Tong et al. (2016) study OTA when the arrivals of both workers and tasks are in random
order. Their algorithms achieve a competitive ratio of 1/4. Concurrent with our work, Dickerson
et al. (2018) study a similar model with two-sided, i.i.d. arrivals. They prove that a non-adaptive
algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 0.295. Further, they show that no online algorithm can
achieve a ratio better than 0.581, even if all rewards are the same. Note that both the models
of Tong et al. (2016) and Dickerson et al. (2018) are more restrictive than ours. In a model with
time-varying arrivals such as ours, non-adaptive algorithms such as the one proposed by Dickerson
et al. (2018), or a greedy algorithms such as one of the algorithms proposed by Tong et al. (2016),
are unlikely to perform well.
2.5. Revenue Management
Our work is also related to the revenue management literature. We refer to Talluri and Van Ryzin
(2004) for a comprehensive review of this literature.
Our work is related to the still limited literature on designing policies for revenue management
that are have worst-case performance guarantees. Ball and Queyranne (2009) analyze online algo-
rithms for the single-leg revenue-management problem. Their performance metric compares online
algorithms with an optimal offline algorithm under the worst-case instance of demand arrivals.
They prove that the competitive ratio cannot be bounded by any constant when there are arbitrar-
ily many customer types. Qin, Zhang, Hua and Shi (2015) study approximation algorithms for an
admission control problem for a single resource when customer arrival processes can be correlated
over time. They prove a constant approximation ratio for the case of two customer types, and
also for the case of multiple customer types with specific restrictions. They allow only one type
of resource to be allocated. Gallego, Li, Truong and Wang (2015) study online algorithms for a
personalized choice-based revenue-management problem. They allow multiple customer types and
products, and non-stationary independent demand arrivals. They allow customers to select from
assortments of offered products according to a general choice model. They prove that an LP-based
policy earns at least half of the expected revenue of an optimal policy that has full hindsight.
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3. Prophet Inequality with Correlated Arrivals
3.1. Problem Formulation
Throughout this paper, we let [k] denote the set {1,2, . . . , k} for any positive integer k.
Consider a finite planning horizon of T periods. There are I customer types and one unit of a
single resource that is managed by some platform. In each period t, depending on exogenous state
information St that is observable by time t, a customer of type i will arrive with some probability
pit(St). Upon an arrival of a customer, the platform can either sell the resource to the customer,
or irrevocably reject the customer. The reward earned by the platform for selling the resource to
a customer of type i ∈ [I] in period t ∈ [T ] is rit ≥ 0. The goal of the platform is to maximize the
expected total reward collected over the planning horizon.
Unlike existing research assuming independent or stationary arrival distributions, we allow the
sequence of arrival probabilities (p1t(St), p2t(St), . . . , pIt(St))t=1,...,T to be a correlated stochastic
process, which depends on the sample path (S1, S2, . . . , ST ) that is realized. We assume that we
know the joint distribution of this stochastic process of arrival probabilities, that is, the distribution
of {St}, and the distribution of arrivals conditional upon {St}. As a simple example, St may
represent the weather history at times {1, . . . , t}. Our model would capture any correlation in the
weather forecast, and assumes that the customer arrival probabilities pit(St) in each period t are
determined by the weather history St up to time t.
Let Xit ∈ {0,1} be the random variable indicating whether a customer of type i∈ [I] will arrive
in period t ∈ [T ], in state St. We must have E[Xit|St] = pit(St). We assume the time increments
are sufficiently fine so that, similar to many standard models in revenue management (van Ryzin
and Talluri 2005), we can assume that at most one customer arrives in any given period. More
precisely, we apply the common practice in revenue management assuming that
∑
i∈[I] pit(St)≤ 1
almost surely for all t∈ [T ], and
Xit = 1{ut ∈ [
i−1∑
k=1
pkt(St),
i∑
k=1
pkt(St))}, (1)
where ut is an independent [0,1] uniform random variable associated with period t. As a result, we
have
∑
i∈[I]Xit ≤ 1 almost surely for all t∈ [T ].
In each period t∈ [T ], events take place in the following order:
1. The platform observes St, and thus knows pit(St) for all i∈ [I].
2. The arrivals (X1t, . . . ,XIt) are realized according to (1).
3. The platform decides whether to sell the resource to the arriving customer if any.
Let St denote the support of St, for all t∈ [T ]. Without loss of generality and for ease of notation,
we define St as the set of external information in all the periods 1,2, . . . , t. As a result, given any St,
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the path (S1, . . . , St) is uniquely determined. We call a realization of ST a sample path. We assume
that we know the joint distribution of (S1, . . . , ST ) in the sense that we are able to simulate the
sample paths, and able to estimate the expected values of functions of the sample paths.
We can use a tree structure to represent the process (St)t∈[T ]. Let S0 be a dummy root node of
the tree. Every realization of S1 is a direct descendant of S0. Recursively, for any tree node that
is a realization of St, its direct descendants are all the different realizations of St+1 conditional on
the value of St.
3.2. Definition of Competitive Ratios
We will state the prophet inequality with correlated arrivals by proving the competitive ratio of
an algorithm used by the platform. Specifically, define an optimal offline algorithm OFF as an
algorithm that knows (Xit)i∈[I];t∈[T ] at the beginning of period 1 and makes optimal decisions to
sell the resource given this information. By contrast, the platform can use an online algorithm to
make decisions in each period t ∈ [T ] based on only St and (Xit′)i∈[I];t′∈[t]. We use V OFF to denote
the reward of OFF, and V ON the reward of an online algorithm ON.
Definition 1. An online algorithm ON is c-competitive if
E[V ON]≥ cE[V OFF],
where the expectation is taken over both ST and the random arrivals (Xit)i∈[I];t∈[T ].
3.3. Offline Algorithm and Its Upper Bound
We first show that the expected reward of the offline algorithm can be bounded from above by the
expected total reward collected from the entire sample path.
Proposition 1. E[V OFF]≤E[∑Tt=1∑Ii=1 ritpit(St)].
Proof. Suppose the resource has infinitely many units, so that the platform sells one unit of
the resource to every arriving customer. The resulting expected total reward
E[
∑
i∈[I]
∑
t∈[T ]
ritXit] =
∑
i∈[I]
∑
t∈[T ]
ritE[Xit] =
∑
i∈[I]
∑
t∈[T ]
ritE[pit(St)]
is clearly an upper bound on E[V OFF]. 
4. Online Algorithm
In this section, we propose a simulation-based threshold policy (STP) for the model of prophet
inequality with correlated arrivals and prove its performance guarantee.
Conditioned on any sample path ST , define
T (ST ) :=
∑
i∈[I]
∑
t∈[T ]
pit(St)
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as the total expected number of customer arrivals.
STP needs to know a uniform upper bound T¯ on T (·) (i.e., T¯ ≥ T (ST ) with probability one).
Given such a T¯ , STP computes the threshold
h(St) :=E
[ ∑T
t′=t+1
∑I
i=1 rit′pit′(St′)
1 + T¯ −∑tt′=1∑Ii=1 pit′(St′)
∣∣ St] (2)
for deciding whether to sell the resource in period t. Specifically, upon an arrival of a type-i customer
in period t, if the resource is still available, STP sells the resource to the customer if rit ≥ h(St) and
rejects the customer otherwise. Note that h(·) can be computed for each scenario St by simulating
the sample paths that potentially arise conditional upon St. In particular, by Proposition 1 and
the definition of h(·), we have (recall that S0 is a (deterministic) dummy variable)
h(S0) =E
[∑T
t′=1
∑I
i=1 rit′pit′(St′)
1 + T¯
∣∣ S0]= E[∑Tt′=1∑Ii=1 rit′pit′(St′)]
1 + T¯ ≥
E[V OFF]
1 + T¯ . (3)
Given that E[V OFF] can be upper-bounded by h(S0) with a multiplicative factor, the goal of our
analysis is to establish a relationship between h(S0) and the expected reward E[V STP] of our online
algorithm.
4.1. Performance Guarantee
In this section, we provide two methods for proving the prophet inequality, i.e., the competitive
ratio of STP, under correlated arrival probabilities. The first method is constructive in the sense
that it reasons about the structure of a worst-case problem instance, and exhibits this structure
explicitly. The second method is deductive in that it proves the existence of the bound without
shedding light on the worst-case problem instance.
4.1.1. Constructive method for proving performance bound. With the constructive
method, we focus on proving the competitive ratio of STP for the case T¯ = 1. Since all the decisions
made by an online algorithm are based on the realized value of S1, we can assume without loss of
generality that S1 is deterministic (i.e., the competitive ratio holds when S1 is set to be any of its
possible realizations).
Then we fix the upper bound
R :=
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
E[ritpit(St)|S1] (4)
on V OFF. We will transform problem data progressively, each time making the expected total
reward of STP smaller on this instance. Then we will show that at some point, the expected total
reward of STP is easily bounded below by a constant.
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Conditioned on St and the event that the resource has not been sold by the beginning of period
t, let V STP(St) be the expected reward earned from assigning it to a demand unit during periods
from t to T . We can express V STP(St) explicitly by the following recursion:
V STP(St) =
I∑
i=1
pit(St)1(rit ≥ h(St))
(
rit−E[V STP(St+1)|St]
)
+E[V STP(St+1)|St], (5)
and V STP(ST+1) = 0.
We will work with the tree representation of the stochastic process S1, S2, . . . , ST . We call a node
St in the tree a terminal node if pit(St)> 0 for some i but pit′(St′) = 0 for all i= 1,2, ..., I and all
descendants St′ of St.
We will arrive at our bound by proving two sets of structural results for the worst-case instance
of the problem. The first set of structural results concern the reward process.
Lemma 1. Assume that the given problem instance achieves the worst-case ratio V STP/V OFF.
Then without loss of generality,
1.
∑T
t′=1
∑I
i=1 pit′(St′) = T¯ almost surely.
2. The reward is scenario dependent. That is, demand unit (i, t) has reward rit(St) at each
scenario St.
3. In each scenario St, there is at most one customer type with positive arrival probability. We
thus use p(St) and r(St) to denote the arrival probability and the reward of that customer type.
4. r(St) = h(St) or r(St) = (h(St))
− for all non-terminal nodes St.
Proof. The first property is easy to see, since we can always add nodes with 0 reward and posi-
tive arrival probabilities to paths in the tree to ensure that the property holds. This transformation
does not change either R or the outcome of STP.
By adding demand types if necessary, we can assume without loss of generality that the reward
is scenario dependent. That is, demand unit (i, t) has reward rit(St) at each scenario St.
We can split up each period into several periods if necessary, such that each scenario St has at
most one arrival with probability p(St) and reward r(St). This change preserves R and decreases
the expected reward for h according to (5), if the rewards are chosen to be increasing with time.
In the tree representation, if there is some highest-level non-terminal node St for which r(St)>
h(St) then conditioned on St, we can decrease r(St) and scale up r(St′) by some factor for all
scenarios St′ that descend from St, using the same factor for all St′ , such that the value of
T∑
t′=t
E[r(St′)p(St′)|St]
is unchanged. As a result, the equality in (4) is maintained. Do this until r(St) = h(St).
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We claim that this change decreases V STP(St), hence V
STP(S1). To see the claim, note that
according to (5), the change reduces the immediate reward given St by some amount ∆ and
increases the future reward given St by no more than ∆. Thus the net effect is to reduce V
STP(St).
Also, since the value of h(Ss) and the rewards stay the same for every node Ss preceding St,
V STP(S1), is reduced.
In the tree representation, if there is some highest-level non-terminal node St for which r(St)<
h(St) then conditioned on St, we can increase r(St) by a small amount and scale down r(St′) by
some factor for all scenarios St′ descending from St, using the same factor for all St′ , such that the
equality in (4) is maintained and all rewards remain non-negative. Do this until r(St) = (h(St))
−,
where (h(St))
− denotes a value infinitessimally smaller than h(St). It is easy to see that this change
decreases V STP(St). Hence V
STP(S1) is decreased as we argued just above. Repeat the previous
transformations until at all non-terminal nodes St, we have r(St) = h(St) or r(St) = (h(St))
−. 
Lemma 1 implies that T (ST ) = T¯ in the worst-case instance. We will assume for the rest of the
subsection that our worst-case data has the structure imposed by Lemma 1. Therefore, for the rest
of this subsection, we write the threshold function h in the following alternative way
h(St) =E
[ ∑T
t′=t+1
∑I
i=1 rit′pit′(St′)
1 +
∑T
t′=t+1
∑I
i=1 pit′(St′)
∣∣ St] . (6)
Our second set of structural results concern the arrival probabilities.
Lemma 2. Let T¯ = 1. Assume that the data achieves the worst-case ratio V STP/R. Without loss
of generality, for T ≥ 2, the followings hold:
1. There is a unique path S1, S2, . . . , ST with positive arrival probabilities.
2. At every node St, t= 1, . . . , T − 1, r(St) = h(ST ) =E[r(ST )p(ST )|St];
3. p(St) = 0, t= 2, . . . , T ;
4. V STP(S1)≥ R2 .
Proof. We will prove the theorem by induction on T . First, we prove the result for T = 2. By
the tree reward simplifications,
r(S1)≈ h(S1) =
∑
u∈S2
P(S2 = u|S1)r(u)p(u)
1 + p(u)
≤
∑
u∈S2
P(S2 = u|S1)r(u)p(u) =E[V STP(S2)|S1].
Therefore r(S1) = h(S1) to make V
STP(S1) as small as possible. Define
c2 =
∑
u∈S2
P[S2 = u]p(u),
R2 =
∑
u∈S2
P[S2 = u]p(u)r(u),
c = c2 + p(S1).
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Notice that by definition of R we have
R=R2 + p(S1)r(S1).
Fix R, R2, and c. Consider what happens when we scale down c2 by a factor α, scale up r(u)
for leaf nodes u to maintain R2 constant, and scale down r(S1) to maintain p(S1)r(S1) =R−R2
constant. We argue that we will reduce V STP(S1) while keeping R constant. Indeed, for α= 1,
p(S1) = T¯ −αc2.
This implies that
V STP(S1) = p(S1)r(S1) + (1− p(S1))
∑
u
P[S2 = u]p(u)r(u),
= R−R2 + (1− T¯ +αc2)R2.
This is where we make p(S1)r(S1) =R−R2. Hence,
∂V STP(S1)
∂α
= c2R2 ≥ 0.
Therefore, V STP/R is minimized when α= 0, or p(S2) = 0 for all S2 ∈ S2. Therefore, the base case
is proved.
Assume the theorem holds for T − 1. Fix c+ = ∑Tt=2 P(St|S1)p(St) and R+ =∑T
t=2 P(St|S1)p(St)r(St). Let the immediate successors of S1 be Sk2 , k= 1, . . . ,K. Let
Rk =E[
T∑
t=2
r(St)p(St)|Sk2 ],
k= 1, . . . ,K. Since the instance that minimizes V STP(S1) must minimize E[V (S2)|S1] subject to c+
and R+, we have by the induction hypothesis, that
E[V STP(S2)|S1] ≥
K∑
1
P(Sk2 )
Rk
2
=
R+
2
.
This lower bound is attained when K = 1,
∑T
t=2 P(St|SK2 )p(St) = 1, p(St) = 0 for all t= 3, . . . , T ,
and P(SK2 |S1) = c− p(S1).
By the induction hypothesis, V STP(S2) = E[p(ST )r(ST )|S2] = h(S1). We also know that r(S1)≈
h(S1) by the tree reward simplifications, we conclude that r(S1) = h(S1), since the impact on
V STP(S1) is the same in either case. Thus,
V STP(S1) = E[p(ST )r(ST )|S1].
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We know that
R = p(ST )r(ST )(P(ST |S1) +
T−1∑
s=1
P(Ss|S1)P(ST |Ss)p(Ss))
= p(ST )r(ST )(P(ST |S1) +P(SK2 |S1)P(ST |SK2 )p(SK2 ) +P(ST |S1)p(S1))
= p(ST )r(ST )P(ST |S1)(1 + p(SK2 ) + p(S1)).
This implies that
V STP(S1) = p(ST )r(ST )P(ST |S1)
=
R
1 + p(SK2 ) + p(S1)
≥ R
2
,
with the lower bound being realizable when p(SK2 ) = 0 and p(S1) = 1. By induction, the lemma
holds for all T . 
Lemmas 1 and 2 and Proposition 1 combine to give us the competitive ratio of STP directly:
Theorem 1. For T¯ = 1, we have
V STP(S1)≥ R
2
=
1
2
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
E[ritpit(St)|S1]≥ 1
2
E[V OFF]. (7)
4.1.2. Reductive martingale method for proving performance bound. In this section,
we provide an alternative, reductive proof for the performance bound of STP that works for a more
general case, when T¯ > 0.
Define τ ∈ [T + 1] as the random period in which the resource is sold to a customer under STP.
If the resource is not sold at the end of the last period T , we set τ = T + 1. In this way, τ is a
stopping time bounded from above by T + 1. We define pi,T+1(ST+1) = 0 for all i∈ [I].
Define a stochastic process {Z(St)}t=0,1,...,T+1 as
Z(St) = h(St) +
t∑
t′=1
I∑
i=1
pit′(St′)(rit′ −h(St′))+.
Proposition 2. E[V STP] =E[Z(Sτ )].
Proof. Recall that in any period t ∈ [T ], at most one customer can arrive, i.e., ∑Ii=1Xit ≤ 1
with probability one.
For any t ∈ [T ], conditioned on τ = t, i.e., STP sells the resource in period t, the following two
conditions must hold:
1. Exactly one customer arrives in period t, i.e.,
∑I
i=1Xit = 1.
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2. The type i of the customer who arrives in period t must satisfy the threshold condition
rit ≥ h(St) (so that STP sells the resource), or more precisely,
∑I
i=1Xit(rit−h(St))≥ 0.
Altogether, using the fact that Xit’s are indicators, we can obtain
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St)) =
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St))+. (8)
The expected reward of STP is
E[V STP] =E
[
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
Xitrit1(τ = t)
]
=E
[
T∑
t=1
(
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St)) +
I∑
i=1
Xith(St)
)
1(τ = t)
]
¬
=E
[
T∑
t=1
(
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St)) +h(St)
)
1(τ = t)
]
­
=E
[
T∑
t=1
(
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St))+ +h(St)
)
1(τ = t)
]
=E
[
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St))+1(τ = t)
]
+E
[
T∑
t=1
h(St)1(τ = t)
]
®
=E
[
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St))+1(τ = t)
]
+E[h(Sτ )].
Above, ¬ is because
∑
i∈[I]Xit = 1 conditioned on τ = t ∈ [T ]; ­ is by equation (8); ® is because
the definition of h(·) naturally gives h(ST+1) = 0.
If τ > t, i.e., STP does not sell the resource in period 1,2, . . . , t, then any customer who arrives
in period t must not satisfy the threshold condition. Thus, conditioned on τ > t, we must have∑I
i=1Xit(rit−h(St))+ = 0. Consequently,
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St))+1(τ > t) = 0
=⇒
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St))+1(τ = t) =
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St))+1(τ ≥ t).
Then the expected reward can be further written as
E[V STP] =E
[
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St))+1(τ = t)
]
+E[h(Sτ )]
=E
[
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St))+1(τ ≥ t)
]
+E[h(Sτ )]
=E
[
T∑
t=1
E
[
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St))+1(τ ≥ t)
∣∣St,{Xi′t′}i′=1,2,...,I;t′=1,2,...,t−1]]+E[h(Sτ )]
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=E
[
T∑
t=1
E
[
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St))+
∣∣St,{Xi′t′}i′=1,2,...,I;t′=1,2,...,t−1]1(τ ≥ t)]+E[h(Sτ )]
(the event τ ≥ t depends only on the information from periods 1 to t− 1)
=E
[
T∑
t=1
E
[
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St))+|St
]
1(τ ≥ t)
]
+E[h(Sτ )].
Finally, we use pit(St) =E[Xit|St] and pi,T+1(ST+1) = 0 to obtain
E[V STP] =E
[
T∑
t=1
E
[
I∑
i=1
Xit(rit−h(St))+|St
]
1(τ ≥ t)
]
+E[h(Sτ )]
=E
[
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
pit(St)(rit−h(St))+1(τ ≥ t)
]
+E[h(Sτ )]
=E
[
τ∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
pit(St)(rit−h(St))+
]
+E[h(Sτ )]
=E[Z(Sτ )].

Lemma 3. For any b≥ 1, a≥ 0, r1, ..., rn ≥ 0 and p1, ..., pn ≥ 0,
a+
∑n
i=1 piri
b+
∑n
i=1 pi
≤ a
b
+
n∑
i=1
pi(ri− a
b
)+.
Proof. Let I ⊆ {1,2, ..., n} be the set such that ri ≥ a/b for all i∈ I.
a
b
+
n∑
i=1
pi(ri− a
b
)+
=
a
b
+
∑
i∈I
pi(ri− a
b
)
=
(
a
b
+
∑
i∈I pi(ri− ab )
)
(b+
∑
i∈I pi)
b+
∑
i∈I pi
=
a+
∑
i∈I piri + (b− 1 +
∑
i∈I pi)(
∑
i∈I pi(ri− a/b))
b+
∑
i∈I pi
≥a+
∑
i∈I piri
b+
∑
i∈I pi
≥a+
∑n
i=1 piri
b+
∑n
i=1 pi
.
The last inequality follows from the fact that for any j 6∈ I,
rj <
a
b
≤ a+
∑
i∈I piri
b+
∑
i∈I pi
.

Proposition 3. The process {Z(St)}t≥0 is a sub-martingale with respect to St.
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Proof. For any t≥ 1, by definition of Z(St) and Z(St−1), we can obtain
E[Z(St)|St−1]
=E[h(St) +
t∑
t′=1
I∑
i=1
pit′(St′)(rit′ −h(St′))+|St−1]
=E[h(St)−h(St−1) +
I∑
i=1
pit(St)(rit−h(St))+|St−1] +Z(St−1).
It suffices to prove that in expectation, h(St−1)≤ h(St) +
∑I
i=1 pit(St)(rit−h(St))+. We can derive
h(St−1)
=E
[ ∑T
t′=t
∑I
i=1 rit′pit′(St′)
1 + T¯ −∑t−1t′=1∑Ii=1 pit′(St′)
∣∣ St−1]
=E
[ ∑T
t′=t+1
∑I
i=1 rit′pit′(St′) +
∑I
i=1 ritpit(St)
1 + T¯ −∑tt′=1∑Ii=1 pit′(St′) +∑Ii=1 pit(St)
∣∣ St−1]
=E
[
E
[ ∑T
t′=t+1
∑I
i=1 rit′pit′(St′) +
∑I
i=1 ritpit(St)
1 + T¯ −∑tt′=1∑Ii=1 pit′(St′) +∑Ii=1 pit(St)
∣∣St] ∣∣ St−1]
=E
E
[∑T
t′=t+1
∑I
i=1 rit′pit′(St′)|St
]
+
∑I
i=1 ritpit(St)
1 + T¯ −∑tt′=1∑Ii=1 pit′(St′) +∑Ii=1 pit(St)
∣∣ St−1

≤E
E
[∑T
t′=t+1
∑I
i=1 rit′pit′(St′)|St
]
1 + T¯ −∑tt′=1∑Ii=1 pit′(St′) +
I∑
i=1
pit(St)
rit− E
[∑T
t′=t+1
∑I
i=1 rit′pit′(St′)|St
]
1 + T¯ −∑tt′=1∑Ii=1 pit′(St′)
+ ∣∣ St−1

=E
E[ ∑Tt′=t+1∑Ii=1 rit′pit′(St′)
1 + T¯ −∑tt′=1∑Ii=1 pit′(St′) |St
]
+
I∑
i=1
pit(St)
(
rit−E
[ ∑T
t′=t+1
∑I
i=1 rit′pit′(St′)
1 + T¯ −∑tt′=1∑Ii=1 pit′(St′) |St
])+ ∣∣ St−1

=E
[
h(St) +
I∑
i=1
pit(St) (rit−h(St))+
∣∣ St−1] ,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3 and the fact that T¯ is an upper bound on the expected
total number of arrivals on any sample path:
T¯ ≥
t∑
t′=1
I∑
i=1
pit′(St′) =⇒ 1 + T¯ −
t∑
t′=1
I∑
i=1
pit′(St′)≥ 1.

With Propositions 2 and 3 established, we apply the optional stopping theorem, to obtain our
main result, namely the prophet inequality under correlated arrival probabilities:
Theorem 2.
E[V STP]≥E[h(S0)] = E[
∑T
t=1
∑I
i=1 ritpit(St)]
1 + T¯ ≥
E[V OFF]
1 + T¯ .
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Proof.
E[V STP] =E[Z(Sτ )]≥E[Z(S0)] =E[h(S0)] = E[
∑T
t=1
∑I
i=1 ritpit(St)]
1 + T¯ ≥
E[V OFF]
1 + T¯ ,
where the first inequality is by the optimal stopping theorem for sub-martingales, and the last
equality is given by (3).

5. Application to Two-sided Matching Problems
In this section, we describe how our results can be applied to design algorithms for a basic matching
problem in two-sided markets.
5.1. Model
Again consider a finite planning horizon of T periods. There are I types of demand units and J
types of supply units. Both demand and supply units arrive randomly over the T periods. The
demand unit of type i∈ [I] that arrives at time t∈ [T ] if any, can be identified using the pair (i, t).
Similarly, the supply unit of type j ∈ [J ] that arrives at time s ∈ [T ] if any, can be identified with
the pair (j, s).
Each demand unit (i, t) has a known non-negative reward rijts when matched with a supply
unit (j, s). This reward can capture how far apart the units are in time and how compatible their
respective types are. If types i and j are incompatible, then the reward rijts could be very small or
0. If i and j are compatible, then rijts can decrease with the length of the interval [s, t] to capture
the diminishing value of the match when the supply unit must wait for a long time for the demand
unit.
We assume that supply units can wait but demand units cannot. At the end of each period t,
after arrivals of demand and supply units have been observed, the demand unit that arrives in
period t, if any, must be matched immediately to an existing supply unit or rejected. Note that if
a supply unit (j, s) can only wait a finite amount of time, then we can require that rijts = 0 for any
t that is sufficiently large compared to s.
Let Λit ∈ {0,1} be a random indicator of whether demand unit (i, t) arrives, and Mjs ∈ {0,1} a
random indicator of whether supply unit (j, s) arrives. We assume that all the random indicators
Λit, ∀i∈ [I], t∈ [T ], and Mjs, ∀j ∈ [J ], s∈ [T ], are mutually independent.
The arrival probabilities λit := E[Λit] and µjs := E[Mjs] are deterministic and known to the
platform a priori. To avoid trivialities in the analysis, we assume all the λit and µjs are strictly
positive, but their values can be arbitrarily small.
Thus, regardless of the availability of supply units, the demand arrival processes are not cor-
related a priori. However, for each particular supply unit, the best demand unit that should be
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assigned to it must depend on the availability of other supply units. When there are many supply
units, some of them might not even be assigned to any demand unit. By contrast, when there are
very few supply units, each of them can be matched to some demand unit.
We also assume that the time increments are sufficiently fine, so that at most one demand unit
and one supply unit arrive in any period t ∈ [T ]. More precisely, we require ∑i∈[I] λit ≤ 1 and∑
j∈[J] µjs ≤ 1 for all t, s∈ [T ]. Also similar to (1), the arrival events can be defined as
Λit = 1{ut ∈ [
i−1∑
k=1
λkt,
i∑
k=1
λkt)}, Mjs = 1{vs ∈ [
j−1∑
k=1
µks,
j∑
k=1
µks)}, (9)
where u1, . . . , uT and v1, . . . , vT are mutually independent [0,1] uniform random variables.
In any period t, the platform first observes Λ1t, . . . ,ΛIt and M1t, . . . ,MJt. Then, if there is any
arriving demand unit in period t, the platform uses an online algorithm to make an assignment
decision. In other words, a demand unit can be matched to any supply unit arriving in the same
period or earlier.
The objective of the problem is to match demand and supply units in an online manner to
maximize the expected total reward earned over the horizon. We do not allow fractional matchings.
That is, each demand unit must be matched in whole to a supply unit.
5.2. Offline Algorithm and Its Upper Bound
An optimal offline algorithm OFF can see the arrivals of all the demand and supply units (Λ,M)
at the beginning of period 1. Given (Λ,M), The maximum offline reward V OFF(Λ,M) is equal to
the value of the following maximum-weight matching problem.
V OFF(Λ,M) = max
xijts(Λ,M),i∈[I];j∈[J];t,s∈[T ]
∑
i,j,t,s
xijts(Λ,M)rijts
s.t.
∑
i,t
xijts(Λ,M)≤Mjs, ∀j ∈ [J ];s∈ [T ],∑
j,s
xijts(Λ,M)≤Λit, ∀i∈ [I]; t∈ [T ],
xijts(Λ,M)≤ΛitMjs, ∀i∈ [I]; j ∈ [J ]; t, s∈ [T ],
xijts(Λ,M) = 0, ∀i∈ [I]; j ∈ [J ]; t∈ [T ];s= t+ 1, . . . , T,
xijts(Λ,M)≥ 0, ∀i∈ [I]; j ∈ [J ]; t, s∈ [T ].
(10)
In the above LP, the variable xijts(Λ,M) encapsulates the probability that both demand unit (i, t)
and supply unit (j, s) arrive and (i, t) is assigned to (j, s). The fourth constraint requires that a
demand unit in period t cannot be matched to any supply unit arriving later than t.
The competitive ratio c of an online algorithm ON is similarly defined as
c=E[V ON]/E[V OFF(Λ,M)],
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where V ON is the total reward of the online algorithm, and the expectation is taken over (Λ,M).
Note that (10) cannot be solved without a priori access to the realizations of (Λ,M). Thus, we
are interested in finding an upper bound on the expected optimal offline reward E[V OFF(Λ,M)]
when we do not have such a priori access.
The following LP solves for the total probabilities xijts of having demand unit (i, t) arrived and
assigned to (j, s).
max
xijts
∑
i,j,t,s
xijtsrijts
s.t.
∑
i,t
xijts ≤ µjs, ∀j ∈ [J ];s∈ [T ],∑
j,s
xijts ≤ λit, ∀i∈ [I]; t∈ [T ],
xijts ≤ λitµjs, ∀i∈ [I]; j ∈ [J ]; t, s∈ [T ],
xijts = 0, ∀i∈ [I]; j ∈ [J ]; t∈ [T ];s= t+ 1, . . . , T,
xijts ≥ 0, ∀i∈ [I]; j ∈ [J ]; t, s∈ [T ].
(11)
The constraints above are derived from those of (10).
Theorem 3. The optimal objective value of (11) is an upper bound on E[V OFF(Λ,M)].
Proof. Let x∗ijts(Λ,M) be an optimal solution to LP (10). Define a solution to LP (11) as
x¯ijts :=E[x∗ijts(Λ,M)].
Since
∑
i,t x
∗
ijts(Λ,M) ≤Mjs,
∑
j,s x
∗
ijts(Λ,M) ≤ Λit, and x∗ijts(Λ,M) ≤ ΛitMjs are required in
(10), we must have
∑
i,t
x¯ijts =
∑
i,t
E[x∗ijts(Λ,M)]≤E[Mjs] = µjs,∑
j,s
x¯ijts =
∑
j,s
E[x∗ijts(Λ,M)]≤E[Λit] = λit,
x¯ijts =E[x∗ijts(Λ,M)]≤E[ΛitMjs] = λitµjs.
Also, x∗ijts(Λ,M) = 0 for all s > t implies x¯ijts = 0 for all s > t.
Thus, x¯ijts is a feasible solution to LP (11). It follows that the optimal value of LP (11) is an
upper bound on ∑
i,j,t,s
x¯ijtsrijts =
∑
i,j,t,s
E[x∗ijts(Λ,M)]rijts =E[V OFF(Λ,M)].

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5.3. Online Algorithm for Two-Sided Matching
In this section, we describe and analyze a matching algorithm.
The algorithm is composed of two simpler sub-routines, a Separation Subroutine and an Admis-
sion Subroutine. The Separation Subroutine randomly samples a supply unit for each incoming
demand unit. This sampling splits the demand arrivals into separate arrival streams, each coming
to a separate supply unit. Subsequently, for each supply unit independently, the Admission Sub-
routine uses the algorithm in Section 4 to control the matching of at most one among all incoming
demand units to it.
Let St := {0,1}J×t. Define St ∈ St as the information set that records the arrivals of supply units
up to period t. That is,
St = ({Mj1}j=1,2,...,J ,{Mj2}j=1,2,...,J , ...,{Mjt}j=1,2,...,J).
For convenience, let S0 be a dummy constant. In our analysis, ST = M is the sample path of
scenarios defined in Section 3.1.
The matching algorithm first needs to compute an optimal solution x∗ to LP (11). Then, the
Separation Subroutine calculates a probability
pijts(St) :=
min(λit,
∑J
j′=1
∑t
s′=1Mj′s′
x∗
ij′ts′
µj′s′
)∑J
j′=1
∑t
s′=1Mj′s′
x∗
ij′ts′
µj′s′
·Mjs
x∗ijts
µjs
(12)
of choosing (j, s) as a candidate supply unit to be matched to (i, t). Note that if s > t, then we
must have x∗ijts = 0 (see LP (11)) and thus pijts(St) = 0. That is, our algorithm never tries to match
a demand unit in period t to a supply unit arriving later than t.
When applying the prophet inequality theory developed in previous sections, we will fix a supply
unit (j, s), and think of (pijts(St))i,t as the probabilities that demand units “arrive” at (j, s). We
first establish some important properties regarding the arrival probabilities pijts(·).
Proposition 4.
1.
∑I
i=1
∑T
t=1 pijts(St)≤ 1, for all j ∈ [J ] and s∈ [T ].
2.
∑J
j=1
∑t
s=1 pijts(St)≤ λit, for all i∈ [I] and t∈ [T ].
Proof.
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
pijts(St) =
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
min(λit,
∑J
j′=1
∑t
s′=1Mj′s′
x∗
ij′ts′
µj′s′
)∑J
j′=1
∑t
s′=1Mj′s′
x∗
ij′ts′
µj′s′
·Mjs
x∗ijts
µjs
≤Mjs
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
x∗ijts
µjs
≤Mjs
≤ 1,
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where the second inequality is given by the first constraint of LP (11).
We can then derive
J∑
j=1
t∑
s=1
pijts(St)
=
J∑
j=1
t∑
s=1
min(λit,
∑J
j′=1
∑t
s′=1Mj′s′
x∗
ij′ts′
µj′s′
)∑J
j′=1
∑t
s′=1Mj′s′
x∗
ij′ts′
µj′s′
·Mjs
x∗ijts
µjs
=
min(λit,
∑J
j′=1
∑t
s′=1Mj′s′
x∗
ij′ts′
µj′s′
)∑J
j′=1
∑t
s′=1Mj′s′
x∗
ij′ts′
µj′s′
·
J∑
j=1
t∑
s=1
Mjs
x∗ijts
µjs
=min(λit,
J∑
j′=1
t∑
s′=1
Mj′s′
x∗ij′ts′
µj′s′
)
≤λit.

Online Matching Algorithm:
• (Initialization) Solve (11) for an optimal solution x∗.
• Upon an arrival of a demand unit (i, t) in period t:
1. (Separation Subroutine) Randomly pick a supply unit (j, s) with probability pijts(St)/λit, for
all j ∈ [J ], s ∈ [t] (recall that we assume λit to be strictly positive). Notice that by definition of
pijts(·), only those supply units that have arrived (i.e., satisfy Mjs = 1 and s≤ t) can have a positive
probability to be picked.
Also, since Proposition 4 gives
∑
j,s pijts(St)/λit ≤ 1, if the inequality is strict (i.e.,∑
j,s pijts(St)/λit < 1), then it is possible that no supply unit is picked. In such a case, reject the
demand unit directly.
2. (Admission Subroutine) Let Xijts be the indicator of whether demand unit (i, t) arrives and
the Separation Routine picks supply unit (j, s). We have
E[Xijts|St] = P(Λit = 1) · pijts(St)/λit = λit · pijts(St)/λit = pijts(St).
For the supply unit (j, s) picked by the Separation Subroutine (i.e., Xijts = 1), we apply algorithm
STP by viewing (pijts(St))i,t as the sequence of correlated arrival probabilities. Specifically, match
(i, t) to (j, s) if (j, s) is still available and rijts ≥ hjs(St), where
hjs(St) :=E
[∑T
t′=t+1
∑I
i=1 rijt′spijt′s(St′)
2−∑tt′=1∑Ii=1 pijt′s(St′)
∣∣ St] .
Notice that we have chosen T¯ = 1 (see (2)) for this two-sided online matching problem. This is
because the first property of Proposition 4 guarantees
∑I
i=1
∑T
t=1 pijts(St)≤ 1 = T¯ .
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5.4. Performance of the Online Algorithm
We first establish an approximation bound for the Separation Subroutine, which relates the arrival
probabilities pijts(·) to the LP upper bound (11). We start with a technical lemma.
Lemma 4. For any λ> 0 and x> 0,
min(λ,x)
x
≥ 1− 1
4λ
x.
Proof. For x≤ λ, min(λ,x)/x= 1≥ 1− 1
4λ
x.
For x> λ,
min(λ,x)
x
− (1− 1
4λ
x)
=
λ
x
− 1 + 1
4λ
x
=
λ
x
+
1
4
· x
λ
− 1
≥2 ·
√
λ
x
· 1
2
√
x
λ
− 1
≥0.

Using the above lemma and the definition of pijts(·), we are ready to prove the proximity of pijts(·)
relative to x∗.
Theorem 4. E[pijts(St)]≥ 0.5x∗ijts.
Proof. Fix any i, j, t, s, but M (and thus St) is random. For any supply unit (j
′, s′), define
Yj′s′ ≡Mj′s′ ·x∗ij′ts′/µj′s′ .
Note that E[Yj′s′ ] = x∗ij′ts′/µj′s′ ·P(Mj′s′ = 1) = x∗ij′ts′/µj′s′ ·µj′s′ = x∗ij′ts′ .
We can then deduce
E[pijts(St)]
=E[
min(λit,
∑
j′,s′ Yj′s′)∑
j′,s′ Yj′s′
·Yjs]
≥E[(1− 1
4λit
∑
j′,s′
Yj′s′) ·Yjs]
(by Lemma 4; if
∑
j′,s′
Yj′s′ = 0, we have Yjs = 0 so the inequality still holds)
=E[1− 1
4λit
∑
j′ 6=j,s′ 6=s
Yj′s′ ]E[Yjs]− 1
4λit
E[Y 2js]
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=(1− 1
4λit
∑
j′ 6=j,s′ 6=s
x∗ij′ts′)x
∗
ijts−
1
4λit
x∗ijts ·x∗ijts/µjs
≥(1− 1
4
)x∗ijts−
1
4
x∗ijts
(because the constraints of LP (11) requires
∑
j′s′
x∗ij′ts′ ≤ λit and x∗ijts ≤ µjsλit)
=
1
2
x∗ijts.

Now, we tie together the above approximation bound with the prophet inequality established in
Section 4:
Theorem 5. The total reward V ON of our matching algorithm satisfies
E[V ON]≥ 1
4
E[V OFF(Λ,M)].
Proof. Fix any (j, s) for j ∈ [J ] and s∈ [T ]. A demand unit (i, t) is matched to (j, s) if and only
if Xijts = 1 and rijts ≥ hjs(St). This is exactly the single-resource problem presented in Section 3.1.
Therefore, by Theorem 2, the expected total reward earned from (j, s) is at least (recall that we
choose T¯ = 1 for this two-sided online matching problem)
E[hjs(S0)] =
E[
∑T
t=1
∑I
i=1 rijtspijts(St)]
2
.
We then use Theorem 4 to obtain
E[hjs(S0)] =
E[
∑T
t=1
∑I
i=1 rijtspijts(St)]
2
=
∑T
t=1
∑I
i=1 rijtsE[pijts(St)]
2
≥
∑T
t=1
∑I
i=1 rijtsx
∗
ijts
4
.
Consequently, the total expected reward summed over all supply units is at least
∑
j∈[J]
∑
s∈[T ]
E[hjs(S0)]≥
∑
j∈[J]
∑
s∈[T ]
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
i∈[I] rijtsx
∗
ijts
4
≥ 1
4
E[V OFF(Λ,M)],
where the final inequality follows from Theorem 3. 
Note that the ratio of 1/4 above results from a loss of a factor of 1/2 from the solution of
Prophet Inequalities, and another factor of 1/2 from the tractable approximation to the upper-
bound deterministic LP. Since 1/2 is an upper bound on the competitive ratio for the standard
prophet inequality (which is a special case of our prophet inequality with correlated arrival prob-
abilities), any improvement to the bound of the online algorithm must come from refining the
solution to the LP.
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6. Numerical Studies
In this section, we conduct numerical experiments to explore the performance of our algorithms.
We model our experiments on applications that match employers with freelancers for short-term
projects, such as web design, art painting, and data entry.
We assume there are 30 employer (demand) types and 30 worker (supply) types. We set the
reward rijts according to the formula
rijts = sij · fts · gij,
where we use sij, fts and gij to capture three different aspects of a matching:
• Ability to accomplish tasks. sij represents the ability of workers of type j to work for
employers of type i. We randomly draw sij from a normal distribution N (0,1) for each pair (i, j).
In particular, if sij < 0, the reward of the matching will be negative, and thus no algorithm will
ever match worker type j to employer type i.
• Idle time of workers. It may be wise to limit the total time that a worker is idle in the
system before being assigned a job. Thus, we set
fts = 1−α+αe−(t−s)/τ
so that the reward of a matching is discounted by α when the idle time of the worker exceeds τ .
• Geographical distance. Certain freelance jobs may require a short commute distance
between workers and employers. For demonstration purpose, we assume that each worker type and
employer type is associated with a random zip code in Manhattan, with probability proportional
to the total population in the zip code zone. Let d(i, j) be the Manhattan distance between the
centers of zip code zones of worker type j and employer type i. We assume that
gij = 1−β+βe−d(i,j)/ω,
so the reward is discounted by β when the commute distance exceeds ω.
We consider a horizon of 60 periods. Depending on the application, one period may correspond
to a day or a 10-minute span. In any period, a random number of workers may sign in to be ready
to provide service. The type of a worker is uniformly drawn from all the worker types. Let µ(t)
be the rate at which workers appear in the system. Similarly, when an employer arrives, the type
of the employer is uniformly drawn from all the employer types. Let λ(t) be the arrival rate of
employers.
We randomly generate multiple test scenarios. In each scenario, we independently draw µ(t) and
λ(t), for every period t, from a uniform distribution over [0,1]. Given the rates µ(t) and λ(t), we
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further vary other model parameters by first choosing the base case to be α= 0.5, τ = 10 (periods),
β = 0.5, ω= 0.05◦, and then each time varying one of these parameters.
We test the following algorithms:
• (ON) Our online algorithm without resource sharing.
• (ON1+) A variant of our online algorithm with resource sharing. When ON1+ rejects a customer
in the admission subroutine, ON1+ offers another resource with the largest non-negative margin
E
[∑T
t′=t+1
∑I
i=1 rit′pit′(St′)
2−∑tt′=1∑Ii=1 pit′(St′)
∣∣ St]− rijts.
• (ON2+) A variant of our online algorithm with resource sharing. When ON2+ rejects a customer
in the admission subroutine, ON2+ offers another resource with the largest non-negative margin
130%×E
[∑T
t′=t+1
∑I
i=1 rit′pit′(St′)
2−∑tt′=1∑Ii=1 pit′(St′)
∣∣ St]− rijts.
• (ON3+) A variant of our online algorithm with resource sharing. When ON3+ rejects a customer
in the admission subroutine, ON3+ offers another resource with the largest non-negative margin
160%×E
[∑T
t′=t+1
∑I
i=1 rit′pit′(St′)
2−∑tt′=1∑Ii=1 pit′(St′)
∣∣ St]− rijts.
• (ON4+) A variant of our online algorithm with resource sharing. When ON4+ rejects a customer
in the admission subroutine, ON4+ offers another resource with the largest non-negative margin
200%×E
[∑T
t′=t+1
∑I
i=1 rit′pit′(St′)
2−∑tt′=1∑Ii=1 pit′(St′)
∣∣ St]− rijts.
• A greedy algorithm that always offers a resource with the highest reward.
• A bid-price heuristic based on the optimal dual prices of LP (10)
We report numerical results in Tables 1 to 4, where the performance of each algorithm is sim-
ulated using 1000 replicates. For our online algorithms, in each period we compute the threshold
hjs(St) by simulating 100 future sample paths. We find that, despite the 1/4 provable ratio, the
algorithm ON captures about half of the offline expected reward, and the improved algorithms ON1+
and ON2+ capture 65% to 70% of the offline expected reward. Moreover, the improved algorithms
outperform the greedy and the bid-price heuristics in all scenarios. These results demonstrate the
advantage of using our online algorithms as they have not only optimized performance in the
worst-case scenario, but satisfactory performance on average as well.
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Table 1 Scenario 1. Performance of different algorithms relative to LP (10).
ON Greedy BPH ON1+ ON
2
+ ON
3
+ ON
4
+
Base 49.8% 62.2% 63.7% 66.1% 67.9% 67.9% 67.5%
α= 0 48.0% 56.9% 63.4% 65.3% 67.6% 67.9% 67.4%
α= 0.2 48.6% 58.8% 64.0% 65.7% 67.8% 67.9% 67.5%
α= 0.8 51.8% 64.9% 62.9% 66.1% 67.6% 67.6% 67.2%
α= 1 53.4% 65.3% 64.0% 65.7% 66.9% 66.8% 66.4%
τ = 2 50.3% 62.8% 65.7% 66.9% 68.8% 69.0% 68.3%
τ = 5 50.3% 63.1% 64.8% 66.6% 68.2% 68.5% 67.9%
τ = 20 49.3% 60.8% 63.2% 65.8% 67.5% 67.8% 67.4%
τ = 30 49.1% 60.0% 63.2% 65.6% 67.6% 67.7% 67.1%
β = 0 49.9% 62.6% 63.6% 66.1% 68.0% 68.1% 67.5%
β = 0.2 49.9% 62.6% 63.7% 66.1% 68.0% 67.9% 67.7%
β = 0.8 49.9% 60.4% 63.2% 65.3% 67.0% 67.1% 66.6%
β = 1 49.6% 56.9% 62.4% 64.0% 65.7% 65.8% 65.4%
ω= 0.005 49.7% 61.1% 63.0% 65.6% 67.4% 67.4% 66.9%
ω= 0.02 49.8% 61.6% 63.5% 65.8% 67.6% 67.6% 67.1%
ω= 0.08 49.9% 62.5% 63.8% 66.2% 68.0% 68.1% 67.5%
ω= 0.15 50.1% 62.7% 63.7% 66.1% 68.0% 68.2% 67.6%
Table 2 Scenario 2. Performance of different algorithms relative to LP (10).
ON Greedy BPH ON1+ ON
2
+ ON
3
+ ON
4
+
Base 50.3% 65.4% 66.6% 67.7% 69.6% 69.4% 69.2%
α= 0 48.2% 61.2% 67.3% 67.9% 70.1% 70.3% 70.0%
α= 0.2 49.2% 63.1% 67.3% 67.8% 69.9% 70.1% 69.7%
α= 0.8 51.7% 66.5% 65.1% 67.0% 68.7% 68.4% 68.2%
α= 1 52.5% 66.5% 65.2% 66.1% 67.7% 67.5% 67.1%
τ = 2 51.3% 67.4% 69.3% 69.4% 71.5% 71.3% 71.0%
τ = 5 50.9% 66.6% 67.8% 68.3% 70.1% 70.0% 69.7%
τ = 20 49.7% 64.1% 66.3% 67.4% 69.6% 69.5% 69.2%
τ = 30 49.4% 63.5% 66.3% 67.6% 69.6% 69.5% 69.4%
β = 0 50.5% 66.5% 67.1% 68.6% 70.5% 70.4% 69.9%
β = 0.2 50.5% 66.4% 66.9% 68.3% 70.3% 70.0% 69.8%
β = 0.8 50.1% 62.4% 65.9% 66.2% 68.1% 67.8% 67.7%
β = 1 50.4% 58.2% 64.8% 64.5% 66.5% 66.3% 66.1%
ω= 0.005 50.2% 64.6% 66.0% 67.1% 68.9% 68.7% 68.6%
ω= 0.02 50.2% 64.9% 66.2% 67.3% 69.3% 69.0% 68.8%
ω= 0.08 50.4% 65.8% 66.7% 68.0% 69.8% 69.7% 69.5%
ω= 0.15 50.3% 66.1% 67.0% 68.2% 70.2% 70.1% 69.8%
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